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THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZED EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS IN NON-UNION FACILITIES: SOME
NEW EVIDENCE OF FLEXIBILITY
WILLIAM P. SCHURGIN*

The National Labor Relations Board' recently has issued a
number of decisions which suggest its uneasiness with the breadth historically attributed to the statutory definition of a "labor organization"
under section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. 2 While the
Board continues to grant preference to a model of labor relations that
presumes management and workers are adversaries, 3 these decisions
reveal a groping for expanded avenues of lawful non-adversarial employer-employee interaction. In essence, the Board appears to have
limited the scope of the statutory definition of a labor organization in
order to render lawful conduct which would otherwise be proscribed
4
under a strict application of section 8(a)(2).
The provisions of the Act embody two basic goals for our labor
relations system, goals which at times are in tension. A principal purpose of the Act is fostering the collective bargaining process as the
means most likely to accomplish the goal of effective employee repre* Associate, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Illinois; A.B. with High
Distinction, University of Michigan; J.D. Cum Laude, Boston University School of Law; Member
Illinois Bar. An earlier draft of this article received the 1980 Barreca Labor Relations Merit
Scholarship. The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Professor Daniel G. MacLeod of Boston University School of Law, whose endless questions and valuable insights were of
immeasurable aid in the preparation of this article. The author also wishes to thank Charles C.
Jackson for his thoughtful review and criticisms of the later drafts of the article.
1. Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
The National Labor Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)
[hereinafter referred to as the Act].
3. This adversary model of labor relations centers upon the perceived ideological conflict
between management and workers. See Ross, Labor Organizations and the Labor Movement in
Advanced IndustrialSociety, 50 VA. L. REV. 1359 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Ross]. One
author has noted that the adversary model of labor relations includes the following presumptions:
There exists an inherent conflict of interest between employers and employees; this conflict leads to hostility; employers wish to subvert the interests of their employees; no
informed employee would align himself with his employer, any organization of employees in which management plays a part is thus necessarily a fraud and contrary to the
employee's best interests.
Note, New Standards/orDomination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 YALE L.J. 510, 515
(1973) [hereinafter referred to as New Standards].
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). Section 8(a)(2) sets forth the code of conduct employers must observe when interacting with section 2(5) labor organizations. See note 109 infra and accompanying text. The text of section 8(a)(2) appears at text accompanying note 18 mfira.
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sentation in the establishment of wages, hours and conditions of employment. The Act guarantees that employees shall be safeguarded in
their rights to organize labor unions and bargain collectively. 5 Often
overlooked, yet equally important, is the Act's guarantee of employees'
"right to refrain from any or all [of] such activities."' 6 While infringements upon employee free choice which work to impair unionization
are attacked vigorously, 7 the present administration of the Act realistically discourages employees from exercising their right not to be represented by a union while at the same time having some say in the
governance of the work setting. 8 This is unfortunate not only because
it unnecessarily limits the exercise of employee free choice, but also
because it may restrain the efforts of industry to improve productivity.
Over the past decade the productivity of the average American
worker has fallen behind the pace set by other industrial nations in the

5. Section I of the Act states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See also Cox, The Right to Engage in ConcertedActivities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
7. Sections 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) are the primary provisions utilized to protect employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively. Section 8(a)(1) protects employees from employer
interference or coercion in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activity guaranteed
under section 7 of the Act. Section 8(a)(3) prohibits employer discrimination in regard to hiring
and tenure of employment based on union membership. Section 8(a)(5) coupled with section 8(d)
creates a duty upon management to bargain in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other
conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
8. In 1935 when the Act was originally enacted there was good reason for the Board to take
a strict view toward such employer-employee interaction. At that time, over 2,500,000 workers
were in company-dominated unions which acted as mere charades of representation and significantly hampered the efforts of organized labor. Today, however, organized labor plays a predominant role in the workplace and workers no longer require such paternalistic protection. C.
SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, LABOR LAW 419-21 (1968); Jackson, An Alternative to Unionization
and the Wholly Unorganized Shop 4 Legal Basis/or Sanctioning Joint Employer-Employee Committees and Increasing Employee Free Choice, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 809, 809 (1977) [hereinafter
referred to as Jackson]; New Standards, supra note 3, at 510-15. See also Summers, Industrial
Democracy. America's Unfu'fdled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 33, 40-41 (1979).
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free world. 9 A recent report indicates that productivity of the total
non-farm business sector in the United States declined as a whole by
1.1 percent in 1979.10 A significant factor in this disturbing productiv-

ity problem is the growing alienation among workers in this country."I
Through greater worker participation in the operation and management of the workplace, employers and employees can benefit from increased productivity, reduced alienation and improved working
environments. 12
The central thesis of the present examination is that some forms of
employee-management interaction which allow non-unionized employees to affect their working conditions should be permitted under
the Act.13 Traditional interpretations of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the
9.
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 1960-1977
(annual increase in output per hour)
8.8%
7.4%
7.0%
7.4%
6.3%
5.7%
5.5%
6.0%
4.0%
3.4%
2.6%

Japan
Belgium
Denmark
Netherlands
Italy
France
Germany
Sweden
Canada
United Kingdom
United States

Developed from data in Daley & Neef, Productivityand unit Labor Costs in ii Industrial Countries, 1977, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1I, 12 (Nov. 1978). Congress and the Executive Branch

have also reacted to the growing need to improve worker productivity in the United States. See,
e.g., National Productivity and Quality of Working Life Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2401-2471 (1975); Exec.
Order No. 12,089, 43 Fed. Reg. 49,773, as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,107, 44 Fed. Reg. 1055
(1978), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 2401 (1978).
10. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 804, REPORTS ON INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES FOR 1979 (1980).

11. See, e.g., Cooper, Morgan, Foley & Kaplan, Changing Employee Values. Deepening Discontent? 57 HARV. BUS. REV. 117 (Jan.-Feb. 1979); Hackman, Is Job EnrichmentJust a Fad? 53
HARV. BUS. REV. 129 (Jan.-Feb. 1975); Jenkins, Democracy In The Factory, ATLANTIC MONTHLY
Apr. 1973 at 78; Walton, How to Counter Alienation In The Plant, 50 HARV. BUS. REV. 70 (Nov.Dec. 1972).
12. The authorities supporting this view are legion. A recent bibliography and digest can be
found in WORK IN AMERICAN INSTITUTE STUDIES IN PRODUCTIVITY, PRODUCTIVITY AND THE

QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE (Vol. 2 1978).

13. Organized labor has also recognized the significance of employee participation in the
functioning of the workplace. For example, a current Memorandum of Understanding between
U.S. Steel Corporation and the United Steelworkers of America establishing "Labor-Management
Participation Teams," provides, in part:
The parties recognize that a cooperative approach between employees and supervision at the work site in a department or similar unit is essential to the solution of
problems affecting them. Many problems at this level are not readily subject to resolution under existing contractual programs and practices, but affect the ongoing relationships between labor and management at that level. Joint participation in solving these
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Act are the primary obstacles to such interaction.
CHARACTERISTICS OF A "LABOR ORGANIZATION"

2(5)

UNDER SECTION

OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Several sections of the Act work together to protect the right of
employees to be free to choose their own representative and to bargain
collectively. 14 The independent protection of section 8(a)(1) 15 of the
Act accrues whether or not the employer-employee program in question is a labor organization within the meaning of section 2(5), 16 but the
more stringent limitations of section 8(a)(2) apply only where an employer is accused of interfering with or dominating a "labor organization." Section 2(5) defines the term "labor organization" as:
[Any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.17
Section 8(a)(2) provides that:
[I]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer:
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it:
Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published
by the Board pursuant to Section 156 of this title, an employer shall
not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay.18
The successful formulation of workable models of non-adversarial relations between employers and employees in non-union facilities may
thus depend on whether such models are considered statutory labor
organizations subject to the limitations of section 8(a)(2). Therefore,
determining the characteristics of a labor organization under section
2(5) is essential.
problems at the departmental level is an essential ingredient in any effort to improve the
effectiveness of the company's performance and to provide employees with a measure of
involvement adding dignity and worth to their work life.
[1980] 1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS (BNA) § 29:7 1. See also Macy,
The Quality-of-Workli/e Project at Bolivar. An Assessment, 103 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 41, 43 n.5
(July 1980).
14., See notes 5-7 supra.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1II 1979).
16. See text accompanying notes 107-08 infra.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
18. Id. § 158(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. 11I 1979).
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NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.
NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,' 9 is the only case in which the
Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue of what constitutes a
labor organization under section 2(5) of the Act. During World War II,
in response to encouragement by the War Production Board, Cabot
Carbon Company established employee committees at a number of its
unionized and non-unionized facilities. Each committee was comprised of representatives elected by the employees at a given facility
and met monthly with management. The committees' by-laws,
promulgated by the company and published in its policy manual, set
forth the purposes, rights and obligations of the committees. 20 In essence, the committees' purpose as stated in the policy manual was to
provide a procedure for considering employees' problems and ideas in
areas of mutual interest to employees and management. Moreover,
plant committees at non-union plants also were responsible for han19. 360 U.S. 203 (1959), rev'g Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1958),
denying enforcement to International Chemical Workers v. Cabot Carbon Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1633,
(1957).
20. The company policy manual described the purposes, rights and obligations of the committees as follows:
1. To bring about a better understanding between employees in every branch and service of our Company to the end that each will have a better insight of the other's
problems.
2. To provide a definite procedure for considering employees' ideas. As an example,
the following problems are of mutual interest to employees and management:
a. Safety.
b. Increased efficiency in production.
c. Conservation of supplies, materials, and equipment.
d. Encouragement of ingenuity and initiative.
e. Grievances (non-union plants or departments).
It is understood that the Employee Committees do not in any way detract from the
authority and responsibility of the supervisory force but should serve to assist plant
management in general in solving problems of mutual interest. It shall be the Committees' responsibility to:
I. Meet with plant management at regular monthly meetings called by management and to attend any special meetings called by management.
2. Work with management on those problems of mutual interest as set out under
"Purposes."
3. Make recommendations on the suggestions from the employees in accordance
with the Suggestion Plan.
4. Call meetings of the employees if in their judgment this is necessary, and the
Committee may invite management to attend if they think advisable, but all
such meetings will be optional as far as management is concerned and will be on
the employees' time.
5. Handle grievances at nonunion plants and departments according to grievance
procedure set up for these plants and departments. It shall be the duty of the
Committee to call to the attention of management any troublemakers or acts of
disturbance which would tend to lower morale, and it shall be the duty of the
Committee to insist that gripes, grumbling, trouble-making among the employees either stop or be taken up under the regular grievance procedure at the plant.
117 N.L.R.B. at 1640-41.
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dling grievances according to grievance procedures set up for those
2
plants and departments. '
The trial examiner held that the employee committees at Cabot
Carbon were labor organizations within the meaning of section 2(5).22
Although noting the complete absence of any full-fledged negotiation
by the committees on behalf of employees, the trial examiner concluded that the committees' stated purposes and duties, their undisputed discussion and recommendation of changes to management over
mandatory subjects of bargaining and the advocacy role which they
played on behalf of employees in the grievance structure fulfilled the
statutory requirements of a labor organization under the Act. A threemember panel of the Board unanimously adopted the trial examiner's
23
decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the Board's order, 24 reasoning that "Congress intended that employees,
individually or in groups, and independently of labor's undiminished
right to bargain collectively, should be able to discuss problems of mutual interest with their employers without violating the law."' 25 After an
extensive examination of the legislative history of the Act, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the requirement of "dealing with employers"
under section 2(5) would only be satisfied where employees were "bargaining with employers" on behalf of employees. 26 This conclusion
was drawn from the court's combined reading of sections 2(5), 8(a)(2)
27
and 9(a) of the Act.
21. The policy manual provided, in summary, that in the handling of employee grievances at
non-union facilities, the Committee was under a duty to consult with the Foreman, the Assistant
Plant Superintendent and the Plant Superintendent and to consider all the facts. If, after having
done so, the Committee believed that the employee had a just grievance, it presented a formal
written statement of its supporting reasons to the Plant Superintendent, who, thereafter, sent copiesof it, plus his own report and recommendations, to the District Superintendent, the department
head and Industrial Relations Department of the Company. Within five days, a meeting between
the District Superintendent or the department head, or both, and the Committee and the Plant
Superintendent took place in which the Committee and the Plant Manager each presented their
positions. A decision was made at that time by the company, and the Committee could appeal to
the General Manager if they so desired. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 206 n.3

(1959).
22. 117 N.L.R.B. at 1647.
23. Id. at 1633-34.
24. Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1958).
25. Id. at 290.
26. Id. at 285.
27. Section 9(a) of the Act provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the
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The Supreme Court perceived the legislative history of the Act differently and unanimously reversed the Fifth Circuit, reinstating the
Board's order.28 Emphasizing the broad nature of section 2(5), the
Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's equation of "dealing with" and "bargaining with." The Court held that where committees "existed for the
purpose, in part at least, 'of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work'" they would not be exempted from section 2(5) solely
29
because they did not bargain with the employer.
Two independent grounds were found by the Supreme Court to
support its conclusion that the employee committees at Cabot Carbon
were labor organizations. Initially, the Court concluded that the committees' function regarding the presentation of individual grievances to
management "on behalf of employees" placed the committees within
the purview of a statutory labor organization. 30 In essence, this role
made the committees the grievant's advocate and representative before
management, a duty traditionally carried out by a labor organization.
The Court also found that the committees' extensive discussion and
recommendation to management over matters covering nearly every
mandatory subject of bargaining established independent grounds for
finding that the employee committees at Cabot Carbon were indeed
31
labor organizations within the meaning of section 2(5).
The Court went on to reject the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
impact of section 9(a) on the definition of a labor organization under
the Act. Section 9, declared the Court, in no way affected the definition
of a labor organization under section 2(5).32
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement
then in effect: Providedfurther, That the bargaining representative has been given the
opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 259(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The court interpreted section 9(a) as allowing groups
of employees to discuss grievances with management in a committee setting when read in light of
section 8(d)(3) of the proposed Taft-Hartley Amendment. Section 8(d)(3) as incorporated into the
original House version of the Taft-Hartley Amendments would have allowed management to
form and maintain employee committees to meet with it concerning issues of mutual interest.
This section was not adopted by the conference committee. Still, the court stated that while section 8(d)(3) was not part of the final version of the Act as passed by Congress, it was implicitly
accepted under section 9(a). 256 F.2d at 288-89.
28. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
29. Id. at 213.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 213-14.
32. The Supreme Court concluded that since proposed section 8(d)(3) was clearly rejected by
Congress it could not, therefore, be read into section 9(a). 360 U.S. at 217-18. In Feldman &
Steinberg, Employee-Management Committees and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

The specific holding of Cabot Carbon is not surprising. The employee committees at issue therein functioned as true employee advocates and representatives over the same broad range of subjects that a
traditional labor union would address in conventional bargaining. The
ruling is significant, rather, for its broad interpretation of section 2(5)
and the impact of this analysis on other programs less encompassing
than that of Cabot Carbon Company. Through its expansive reading
of the phrase "dealing with employers" in section 2(5), the Supreme
Court arguably created a standard which places the vast majority of
potential employee-employer communication programs in non-union
facilities within the definition of a labor organization under the Act.
In the twenty years since the Supreme Court decided Cabot Carbon, its broad standard has been applied by both the Board and by the
courts of appeals.3 3 Generally, only those employer-employee programs formed solely for social or athletic purposes have escaped characterization as labor organizations. 34 Thus, employers and employees
have been forced to interact almost exclusively within the traditional
collective bargaining model of labor relations.
The principles elaborated in Cabot Carbon epitomize an unnecessarily paternalistic attitude that traditional interpretations of our labor
relations laws display toward the conventional labor movement. By
defining almost every form of employee-employer relations as a labor
organization, the Board and the courts have unnecessarily implanted
the adversary model of labor relations throughout the working environment. 35 While there was certainly good reason to take such a paternalistic approach to the labor movement during the 1930s and 1940s, it
is questionable whether such a view is justified today. 36 In situations
where the employees of a given facility have rejected or do not desire
35 TUL. L. REV. 365 (1961), the authors dispute the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 9(a),
based upon the language of the House Conference Report and its reasons for not adopting section
8(d)(3). While these criticisms of the Supreme Court's reading of section 9(a) are not without
merit, at this point in time, some twenty-two years after the decision in Cabot Carbon, a detailed
reexamination of the Court's reasoning would serve no useful purpose.
33. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Marine, Inc., 465 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Ampex
Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); NLRB v. General Precision, Inc.,
381 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 974 (1967); NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d
177 (5th Cir. 1961); South Nassau Communities Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1980); Alta Bates
Hosp., 226 N.L.R.B. 485 (1976); Solmica, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 224 (1972); Roytype, Division of
Litton, 199 N.L.R.B. 354 (1972). See also note 85 infra.
34. E.g., Hudson Dispatch, 68 N.L.R.B. 115 (1946).
35. The adversary model of labor relations is described at note 3 supra.
36. See note 8 supra. See also Jackson, supra note 8, at 824-25. In reality, many workers
today do not perceive themselves as adversaries of management and often identify with the company. New Standards,supra note 3, at 518. See generally Ross, supra note 3.
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union representation, 37 it is arguable that some alternative non-adversarial employer-employee relationships can be tolerated without significant impairment of collective bargaining as a preferred statutory
38
mechanism.
RECENT EXCEPTIONS TO SECTION

2(5): A

POTENTIAL SHIFT IN

BOARD DOCTRINE

Perhaps in response to growing criticism of its strict paternalistic
approach to sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) questions, the Board recently has
begun to recognize certain limitations upon the scope of section 2(5)
labor organizations. This new group of cases suggests a shift in Board
doctrine that could well open new avenues for non-adversarial labor
relations in the non-union shop. 39 Generally, these cases may be classified as involving adjudicatory grievance committees, employee work
teams and employee attendance at ad hoc meetings with management.
Adjudicatory Grievance Committees
Adjudicatory grievance committees actually decide the merits of
the individual grievance before them, whereas section 2(5) labor organizations function to represent grievants before an outside arbitrator or
management decisionmaker. The adjudicatory employee grievance
committees in Spark's Nugget, Inc. 40 and Mercy-Memorial Hospital
Corp.41 illustrate the first recognized limitation by the Board upon the
definition of a labor organization. 42 In each of these cases the employer created an adjudicatory grievance committee composed of rep37. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that only 19.7% of the total
workforce and 23.6% of the nonagricultural workforce were unionized in 1978. LAB. REL. Y.B.
1979 at 237-38. This represents a 4. 1%decline in the total unionized workforce and 7.9% decline
in the nonagricultural workforce since 1960. Moreover, union membership among factory workers declined from 8.6 million in 1976 to 8.1 million in 1978. Id. at 238.
38. Statutory preference does not, however, automatically translate into popular preference.
A Gallup Poll carried out between May 4-7 of 1979 indicates that public approval of unions has
declined to a 45-year low of 55%, down 21% from 1957. Id. at 238-39.
39. From the outset, however, it must be emphasized that while these cases provide an excellent foundation for new models of non-adversarial employee-employer interaction, they are few in
number.
40. 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977), modfed sub nom. NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571
(9th Cir. 1980).
41. 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977).
42. In Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975), the Board held that the faculty senate at
Northeastern University did not constitute a statutory labor organization. While the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980), may render this portion of the
Northeastern University case moot, its discussion of the limits of section 2(5) still bears analytic
significance. See note 88 infra and accompanying text.
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resentatives of both management and employees. 4 3 Relying on the
committees' adjudicatory function to decide only the individual grievance before it, a majority of the Board held that neither committee constituted a labor organization under section 2(5), as they did not engage
in dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work.44
In Spark's Nugget, the company distributed a memo to all of its
employees outlining the establishment of an "impartial employees'
council" for "employees who are unable to resolve problems with their
supervisors. '4 5 The memo explained the various stages of the grievance process which culminated in final and binding resolution of the
grievance by the council. 46 A ballot also was provided for employees to
select their departmental representatives to the council.
Each ad hoc council consisted of the company's director of employee relations, who sat as chairman, an employee member elected
from the grievant's department and a third member selected by the first
two. The third member had to be from the management of a department other than that of the grievant. The council convened on an ad
hoc basis to consider individual grievances. In essence, it acted much
like a panel of arbitrators, hearing both sides' testimony, receiving exhibits and thereafter rendering a binding decision based on a majority
47
vote of its members.
A majority of the three-member Board panel concluded that the
grievance councils were not section 2(5) labor organizations but rather
were purely adjudicatory grievance committees. After finding no evidence that the councils ever initiated grievances, recommended
43. A recent survey of 800 companies undertaken by the New York based Conference Board
reports that two-thirds of those non-unionized employers surveyed have employee complaint programs which typically allow a grievance to be filed with a top company officer or a neutral third
party. R. BERENBEIM, NONUNION COMPLAINT SYSTEMS: A CORPORATE APPRAISAL 2-6 (1980).
44. Mercy-Memorial Hosp. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1118-19 (1977); Spark's Nugget, 230
N.L.R.B. 275, 275-76 (1977), modified sub noma.
NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th
Cir. 1980). In Spark's Nugget, the Board did find the employer in violation of 8(a)(l), (3) and (5).
These violations were based in part on the company's unilateral establishment of the council without consulting the certified exclusive bargaining representative of its employees, Union Local 86,
Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO. Other violations
included an unlawful solicitation rule, illegal employee interrogation and the unilateral implementation of a new insurance program. 230 N.L.R.B. at 288.
45. Id. at 275.
46. The first two stages of the grievance procedure involved discussions between the grievant
and his supervisor and department head. The grievant could request a hearing before the Employee Grievance Council if dissatisfied with the result at either stage. Id. at 276.
47. The employees' current certified union, Local 86 of the Hotel & Restaurant Employees &
Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, filed unfair labor practice charges against the employer after its unilateral establishment of the employee grievance committee. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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changes in terms or conditions of employment to management or acted
in any manner as an advocate of employee interests, the Board held:
In Cabot Carbon, and in the other cases cited by the Administrative Law Judge in support of his finding that the Employees' Council
is a labor organization, the organizations in question "dealt with" the
respective employers in some sense as the employees' advocates.
Here, however, as noted above, the Employees' Council performs a
purely adjudicatory function and does not interact with management
for any purpose or in any manner other than to render a final decision on the grievance. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Employees' Council herein "deals with" management; i.e., resolving
employee grievances. Accordingly, we conclude that, inasmuch as
the Employees' Council is not a labor organization, Respondent's
said Council was
conduct in instigating, dominating, and assisting
48
not unlawful under Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.

The majority's conclusion in Spark's Nugget, that the absence of
any advocacy or representative role by the employee member of the
council placed it outside of section 2(5), is factually consistent with
Cabot Carbon.49 In his dissent, Chairman Fanning, however, emphasized that individual grievances tend to encompass employee working
conditions generally, and argued that the broad view of "dealing with
employers" expressed in Cabot Carbon should extend to the employee
council in question.5 ° Unfortunately, the dissent failed to recognize the
distinction between an employee committee which represents employees before management in the grievance process and one which actually decides the merits of the grievance before it on behalf of
management.
In Mercy-Memorial,5 ' after a series of general meetings between
employees and management regarding employee dissatisfaction with
the existing grievance mechanisms, 52 the hospital instituted an em48. 230 N.L.R.B. at 276 (footnotes omitted).
49. The employee committees at Cabot Carbon Company did not perform adjudicatory
functions but, rather, advocated employee positions before management. 360 U.S. at 213.
50. Chairman Fanning's dissent parallels the general interpretation of a labor organization
expressed by the courts and the Board since Cabot Carbon. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
51. Two separate hospital facilities, Mercy Hospital and Memorial Hospital, owned and operated by the same corporation, were involved in this case. The employee grievance committee
was utilized at both facilities. 231 N.L.R.B. at 1118.
52. These meetings were called by the hospital in response to employee complaints about the
way its existing grievance procedures operated and the refusal by employees to utilize them. A
total of six meetings between hospital officials and concerned employees occurred between September and November of 1974. The meetings took place at both Mercy and Memorial Hospitals
(which were located approximately one mile apart), with employees of one hospital being permitted to attend any meeting at the other. The meetings centered upon the creation of a viable
grievance structure with employees and management submitting various ideas. As a result of
these meetings the employee grievance committee at issue before the Board was jointly agreed
upon. Id. at 1118-19.
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ployee grievance committee. The major purpose of the committee was
5 3
to allow more employee participation in the grievance procedure.
The committee was composed of a department head and four employ54
ees chosen by the grievant from a list of ten committee members.
When a grievance was heard, the hospital's personnel director
presented a written synopsis of the issues and positions of each party to
the committee. Then each party had an opportunity to present its case
and a decision was rendered. All decisions were made in private by a
majority vote. The decision was binding on the hospital; however, if
the employee was still dissatisfied, he or she was permitted to appeal to
55
the personnel committee of the board of directors.
A majority of the Board 56 adopted the trial examiner's decision
which held:
I am not persuaded that the General Counsel has established by
a preponderance of the evidence that the Grievance Committee here
involved was formed for the purpose of dealing with the Respondent
53. The grievance procedure consisted of three stages. Stage I involved the presentation of
the grievance to the employee's immediate supervisor, while stage II involved his department
head. The procedure at stage IllI was described as follows:
Employee:
1. The employee must present his grievance to the Director of Personnel within three
days following the completion of stage II.
Personnel Director:
2. The Personnel Director will arrange for a meeting of the Grievance Committee and
inform employee and/or designee (if any) of the date.
Grievance Committee:
3. Investigate all aspects of the grievance including meeting (if necessary) with the employee and/or designee (if any).
Grievance Committee:
4. The Committee will render its decision within five days after its meeting. The Committee will inform the Personnel Director of its decision and the Director will inform
the employee.
Employee:
5. If the employee is still not satisfied with the outcome of the grievance, he should
proceed to stage IV.
Id. at 1119.
54. The grievance procedure defined the grievance committee as: "[C]omposed of four employees and one department head. Employees are elected for a one-year term by all employees
and the employee may select a department head of his choice. Any member must have a minimum of three years of continuous employment with the hospital." Subsequently, this definition
was modified to provide for a two-year staggered term for members of the committee. Id. at 1119
n.22.
55. The employee grievance committee at Mercy-Memorial was created in the midst of a
three-year strike by Local 79, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, which had been
certified as the exclusive representative of certain Mercy Hospital employees by the Michigan
Employment Relations Commission in 1970. Memorial Hospital was a completely non-union
facility. Id. at 1109-11, 1118-19. After the strike ended, the union filed unfair labor practice
charges against the hospital based, inter alia, upon its unilateral creation of the committee. Id. at
1118.
56. The majority consisted of Members Penello, Murphy and Walther. Chairman Fanning
and Member Jenkins dissented in part.
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on behalf of employees concerning their grievances or that the committee functioned in that manner. Quite the contrary, the committee
was created simply to give employees a voice in resolving the grievance of their fellow employees at the third level of the grievance procedure, not by presenting to, or discussing or negotiating with
management but by itself deciding the validity of the employees'
and the appropriateness of the disciplinary action, if any,
complaints
57
imposed.
As in Spark's Nugget, emphasis was placed on the adjudicatory
function of the committee and its managerial nature. The majority
went somewhat further, however, by endorsing the stated purpose of
58
the committee-to provide an employee voice in resolving grievances.
Such a view implicitly recognizes that the employee members of the
committee would in fact represent employee interests in decision making, though not in grievance processing. Since the committee was
strictly an adjudicatory body with unilateral powers, it did not "deal
with" the employer. The Board majority thus did not find the potential
internal advocacy among employee members of the committee and
their interaction with management in arriving at a decision sufficient to
bring the committee within the ambit of section 2(5).
Of further importance, the Board majority did not consider the
additional right and obligation of the committee to recommend to
management changes in rules, regulations and standards to bring the
committee within the statutory definition of a labor organization. This
portion of the holding was based on the fact that the committee exercised this power only once and it was, therefore, de minimus.5 9 The
dissent, on the other hand, found this stated purpose brought the committee within the definition of a labor organization. 60 The dissenters'
view comports with the Board's traditional approach to section 2(5).61
The majority's emphasis on the committee's primary or dominant function thus may mark an important positive shift in Board doctrine.
Several subsequent interpretations of Mercy-Memorial and Spark's
Nugget evidence the Board's reluctance to extend the principles it re57. 231 N.L.R.B. at 1121.
58. While the Board did not specifically endorse the legitimacy of this purpose in its order, it
stated that "[tihe Administrative Law Judge's Decision clearly articulates our reasons" for finding
"that the Employees' Grievance Committee does not qualify as a labor organization under the
language of section 2(5)." Id. at 1108. The Administrative Law Judge's endorsement is stated in
the text accompanying note 57 supra.
59. 231 N.L.R.B. at 1121.
60. Chairman Fanning's dissent, in which Member Jenkins joined, emphasized that the declared purposes and actual functions of the committee with regard to making recommendations to
management over mandatory subjects of bargaining brought it under the definition of a labor
organization. Id. at 1109.
61. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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lied upon in those cases to situations involving traditional labor organization activities. 62 In American Tara Corp.,63 for example, an employee
discipline committee was established by the employer to review written
warnings issued by supervisors dealing with employee conduct and to
make recommendations to management on advisable discipline. The
committee also participated with management in the formulation and
enactment of new work rules and regulations governing the conduct
and behavior of employees. A three-member Board panel adopted the
decision of the trial examiner which held that the discipline committee
constituted a labor organization within the meaning of section 2(5) and
distinguished it from the committees in Spark's Nugget and Mercy-Memorial based on its function of "dealing with" management in regard
to formulating new work rules. 64 Similarly, in St. Vincent Hospital,65 a
Board panel rejected an attempt by the employer to expand the principles of Spark's Nugget and Mercy-Memorial to a situation where employee committees engaged in discussion with management over
mandatory subjects of bargaining on behalf of employees.
The decisions in American Tara and St. Vincent show that the
principles enumerated in Mercy-Memorial and Spark's Nugget do not
have unlimited reach. Nevertheless, the decisions in Mercy-Memorial
and Spark'sNugget have remained intact and represent important limi66
tations on the definition of a labor organization under the Act.
Work Teams
Increased employee-employer interaction also has been permitted
by the Board when employee work teams have been established by employers. In GeneralFoods Corp.,6 7 the employer instituted a job enrichment program to allow employees a larger and more meaningful role in
62. St. Vincent Hosp., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1979); American Tara Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 1230
(1978); Mattiace Petrochemical Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 15 (1978). See also Streamway Div. of the Scott
& Frazer Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 396 (1980); South Nassau Communities Hosp., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 67
(1980).
63. 242 N.L.R.B. 1230 (1978).
64. Id. at.2, 25. The more interesting question which the trial examiner did not reach, was
whether the powers of the disciplinary committee in American Tara which were far more advisory
and less adjudicatory than those possessed by the discipline committees in Spark's Nugget and
Mercy-Memorial, placed it within the ambit of a labor organization under section 2(5).
65. 244 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1979).
66. The principles of Spark's Nugget and Mercy-Memorial were adopted and distinguished
by the trial examiner in St. Vincent. See note 85 infra.
67. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). An excellent discussion of the concept of work teams is found
in Note, Does Employer Implementation ofEmployee Production Teams Violate Section 8(a)(2) of
the National Labor Relations Act?, 49 IND. L.J. 516 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Employer
Implementation]. See notes 77, 88 infra.
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their day-to-day activities than was normally assigned in the manual
unskilled operation. As a part of this program, the company instituted
departmentally divided "work teams," which, acting by a consensus of
their members, made job assignments to individual team members, assigned job rotations and scheduled overtime among members. Other
functions of the work teams were carried out by ad hoc committees
whose membership cut across team lines. The ad hoc committees were
assembled by management for specific and limited task force functions,
such as interviewing job applicants or inspecting and reporting on
68
safety infractions within the plant.
When management called team meetings which were held both on
and off company property, members of the team were free to state complaints, but, in so doing, they were speaking only for themselves. The
teams had no disciplinary power nor any formal spokesperson or leadership. 69 Moreover, they lacked all the conventional characteristics of
70
a labor organization.
A three-member Board panel adopted the trial examiner's opinion
which concluded that the "work teams" did not constitute section 2(5)
labor organizations. 7 1 The trial examiner's opinion emphasized that
the purpose for establishing the work teams had nothing to do with
labor relations as that term is generally understood. Rather, the teams
functioned to facilitate the performance of work essential to operating
the facility. 72 In essence, the trial examiner concluded that the work
teams fulfilled a management function and, therefore, did not deal with
management as a labor organization. If the work teams were committees at all, they were "committees of the whole" and thus lacked any
"agency relationship to a larger body on whose behalf it is called to
73
act," which the Board considered the essence of a labor organization.
Similarly, the trial examiner stressed that the responsibilities of the
management-created adhoc committees were flat delegations of managerial functions not normally given unions and thus outside traditional
notions of labor relations. 74 Moreover, while the company maintained
68. 231 N.L.R.B. at 1234.
69. If the teams had selected actual leaders or officers, a significant question would have
arisen as to whether these leaders constituted supervisors under section 2 of the Act, and, if so,
whether the employees dealing with these leaders satisfy the functional requirement for attaining
labor organization status under the Act. See Employer Implementation, supra note 67, at 525.
70. The Board, however, requires only minimal structure to find the existence of a statutory
labor organization. See note 103 infra and accompanying text.
71. 231 N.L.R.B. at 1232.
72. Id. at 1234.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1235.
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the ability to withdraw the authority granted the "work teams" and "ad
hoc" committees at any time, such action would be wholly unilateral
75
on its part without any dealings with employees over the matter.
"Employee Representatives" Attending Ad Hoc
Meetings With Management
The Board's decision in FiberMaterials,Inc.76 provides one additional limitation to section 2(5) that requires brief analysis. In Fiber
Materials, the company's non-supervisory training instructor selected
employees to meet with management on an ad hoc basis to discuss
questions regarding a newly promulgated fringe benefit policy. No
grievances were presented; no negotiations occurred. The selected employees simply asked their own questions about the policy and did not
act as. representatives for other employees. Moreover, management selected different employees for each meeting and maintained no organizational structure whatsoever.
The trial examiner held, and the three-member Board panel affirmed, that the adhoc meetings did not fall within the ambit of section
2(5). Since no formal organization existed, and since the informal
groups which met with management did not raise grievances but
merely asked individual questions about the company's fringe benefit
policy, the trial examiner concluded that no labor organization ex77
isted.
Moving Toward a Responsive FunctionalStandard
The decisions discussed in the preceding section of this article
touch upon every strand of the definition of a labor organization under
section 2(5). While these recent Board decisions are not of uniform
significance, considered together they evidence a positive shift toward a
more functional approach for determining the application of, and limitations upon, the scope of section 2(5) labor organizations. 78 In general, the recent cases appear to be less concerned with subject matter
75. Id. To date, the decision in GeneralFoodshas not been applied in any subsequent Board
or court case. Assuming that it is a principled decision, however, its crucial elements may become
the basis for a broad range of potential applications.
76. 228 N.L.R.B. 933 (1977).
77. Id. at 935.
78. In Employer Implementalion, supra note 67, at 521, the student author maintained that
functional subject matter and structural requirements each must be met in order to establish the
existence of a statutory labor organization. In contrast, a purely functional approach disregards
subject matter and structural requirements, except as they relate to function. Rather, primary
emphasis is placed upon the predominant role and purpose of each given program.
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and more concerned with the functions of the employee group involved. 7 9 In essence, this functional approach focuses on the primary
purpose or function of the employee role in a given program as it relates to the textual requirements of section 2(5) and that section's interpretation by the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon.80
To analyze the potential impact of these recent Board decisions, it
is useful to isolate and discuss the various functional criteria identified
in each decision. Review of these factors will provide a basis for determining their collective conceptual limits, and, in turn, the feasibility of
creating innovative, non-adversarial employee-employer relations in
the non-union shop.
DELEGATION OF MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY

Decision-Making
In determining whether a given program constitutes a labor organization, the Board appears to attribute substantial significance to delegations of managerial authority. 8 1 Thus, in Spark's Nugget 82 and
Mercy-Memorial,83 the adjudicatory function played by the joint employee-employer grievance committees in the disposition of individual
grievances, authority which, in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement is vested exclusively in management, was considered determinative in finding that those committees did not constitute a labor
organization under the Act.
This functional approach reflects a concern for the section 2(5) requirement that a given employee representational scheme exists, at
least in part, for the purpose of "dealing with" employers. That requirement is met in situations where employees act to represent or advocate employee positions concerning wages, hours or working
84
conditions and the decision-making power resides in management.
Where employees act as decision-makers, they do not "deal with employers. ' 85 Moreover, when the employee participation structures are
79. In other words, except as it relates to a given program's role and purpose, subject matter
is not considered in determining whether a given program constitutes a statutory labor organization.
80. See text accompanying notes 19-38 supra.
81. See notes 39 40 & 71 supra and accompanying text.
82. 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977). See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
83. 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977). See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
84. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 213-15 (1959).
85. A concise summary of this principle appears in the trial examiner's opinion in St. Vincent
Hosp., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1979):
The case relied upon by the Respondent for a contrary conclusion, Mercy-Memorial
Hospital Corp., is inapposite; the Board in that case found Mercy-Memonal Hospital
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vested with the power to adjudicate or decide such matters unilaterally,
there is no dealing with employers even though employee representation or advocacy may occur within the internal workings of the pro86
gram.
Similarly, in GeneralFoods,87 the work teams' authority to schedule job assignments, overtime and job rotations for its members were
found to be functions of management outside the ordinary role of labor
unions. If, however, the teams had lacked decisional authority and had
only made recommendations to management, under Cabot Carbon
they would have constituted a labor organization. 88 Therefore, when
reference is made to matters outside the scope of labor union activity, it
appears that the Board is speaking of the unilateralauthority to make
decisions otherwise considered within the scope of mandatory subjects
of bargaining, not the subject matter of the decisions. 89
The holding in General Foods provides the single most expansive
conceptual limitation to the broad definition of a labor organization
recognized by the Board to date. That decision expanded upon the adjudicatory model of Spark'sNugget and Mercy-Memorial by creating a
far broader concept of permissible delegations of managerial authority. 90 By declaring that such managerial delegation of function and authority generally falls outside the traditional role of section 2(5) labor
Employees' Grievance Committee was not a "labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act" because it was not created to "deal with" hospital management
as an employee Representative or advocate with respect to wages, hours or working conditions but rather was created to adjudicate or decide employee grievances over such
matters.
Id. at 6 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
86. See notes 40-60 supra and accompanying text.
87. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
88. But see Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1974), where the Board stated with regard
to the function of the faculty senate at issue therein:
We find that the Faculty Senate functions as advisory committees and makes recommendations (which are totally different from bargaining demands that a union would make
upon an employer during contract negotiations) to the president. Accordingly, we find
that the Faculty Senate does not function as a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
Id. at 248. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
89. One student author has suggested that since management maintains its inherent power to
reject or review any decision or finding made by a work team at all times, the teams actually
recommend potential decisions to management on behalf of employees, and therefore, externally
deal with the employer. Employer Implementation,supra note 67, at 526-28. Withdrawals of authority by management, however, are unilateral and, in essence, change the nature and function of
the team. In the absence of employer withdrawal, the work teams act functionally as decisionmakers and do not, therefore, deal with management. See General Foods, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B.
1232, 1235 (1977).
90. The employee grievance committees in Mercy-Memorial and Spark's Nugget decided
only the individual grievance before them. In General Foods, however, the employer established
an entirely new method of operating many of the day-to-day activities of the workplace.
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organizations, the Board may have opened the door to a much more
flexible approach to employee-employer relations in the non-union
shop.9 1
The range of permissible delegation of managerial authority
should not, however, be viewed as without limits. Each area in which
such delegation occurs must be examined with regard to its scope and
structure. To date, for example, no significance has been placed on
whether management is represented on or comprises a majority of a
given committee's membership. As the scope of the subject matter
dealt with by such committees enlarges, the presence of management,
especially in a majority position, should be carefully considered. In
such situations, the impact of the committee's decisions on general
working conditions increases and management control over committee
voting may become more troublesome. As the employee participation
is diluted, the nature of the employee's role may be less decisional and
more representative in character.
Fact-Finding
Harder to draw expressly from the Board's decisions, yet implicitly
recognized in GeneralFoods92 and a logical extension of the functional
standard utilized in the area of managerial delegation of decision-making authority, fact-finding presents an attractive, non-adversarial
method of employee-employer interaction. The concept of fact-finding
rests on the notion that an employee council which merely investigates
a given set of problems and reports its factual findings to the employer
on matters of mutual concern-without discussion or recommendation--does not deal with the employer within the meaning of section
2(5).
A good example of a fact-finding group outside the ambit of section 2(5) is the safety committee formed by the employer in General
Foods. The purpose of that committee was to "investigate and report"
safety infractions at the facility. It was delegated no authority to act
91. It may be argued that as the workers involved in the programs examined in this section
are engaged in managerial activity, they are not "employees" under the Act, but rather "managers" or "supervisors," and are not, therefore, subject to statutory constraint. See NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). The type
of managerial function involved in the programs analyzed herein does not, however, mirror that
which was at issue in Yeshiva or BellAerospace. The workers participating in the programs under
analysis in this section continue to carry out their normal work activities, which are clearly viewed
within the scope of the Act. Moreover, these normal activities dominate their employment. Thus,
they should not be treated as "supervisors" or "managers." See Employer Implementation, supra
note 67, at 521-24.
92. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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upon discovered violations. Rather, the committee served solely a factfinding function. While such a function also might be labeled managerial in nature, if the committee had not only reported safety infractions to management but had also made recommendations, then section
2(5) might have been triggered. Therefore, it appears that the Board
implicitly recognized that fact-finding is a managerial function outside
the ambit of a labor organization's role under the Act.
In applying a functional standard to fact-finding committees, the
degree of employee advocacy or representation is a crucial determination. Arguably, in the absence of any discussion or recommendations
by such committees to management, functionally they serve a lesser
advocacy or representative role than the employee grievance commit94
tees in Spark's Nugget 93 or Mercy-Memorial.
Under a functional standard, the reporting of factual findings does
not serve any representational or advocacy role. In essence, the subjective judgment involved in fact-finding is no different from the subjective viewpoint of any other decision-maker. Therefore, the Board's
tolerance of employee members of an employee disciplinary committee
implicitly representing the view of their fellow employees should apply
to such implicit representation on employee fact-finding committees.
This implicit representation is not sufficient to qualify fact-finding committees as statutory labor organizations.
Functional validity of fact-finding committees is not, however,
without limits. Where such committees begin to actively solicit employee opinions and complaints in the course of their investigations,
troublesome questions of their status arise. Their reports to management may thus become vehicles of direct advocacy of employee grievances. 95 Therefore, fact-finding committees must be strictly limited in
96
both their methods of investigation and the nature of their reports.
NON-REPRESENTATIONAL COMMITTEES OF THE WHOLE

In General Foods,97 the Board did not accord labor organization
status to a "committee of the whole" consisting of the entire bargaining
93. 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977). See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
94. 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977). See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
95. An example of this sort of problem is a committee formed to find out whether the current
vacation plan is appreciated by the employees at the company. Inherent in soliciting responses to
relevant inquiries is a certain potential for representation that may be suspect under the Act.
96. It must be reemphasized that while fact-finding is a logical extension of the principle of
delegation of managerial authority, it has never been specifically embraced by the Board.
97. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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unit.98 The trial examiner's decision held that the essence of a "labor
organization" is "a group or person which stands in an agency relationship to a larger body on whose behalf it is called upon to act." 99 In the
absence of such an agency relationship, no labor organization exists. 100
Under the functional standard, a group's or person's status as an
agent of others would be fulfilled whenever actual or perceived representational conduct took place on behalf of others.' 0' Thus, when employees elect representatives to advocate their positions,
representational status is attained. Furthermore, where management
chooses employees to make recommendations on behalf of their fellow
employees, under a functional analysis they attain representational status. A harder case is presented where "ad hoc" discussions between
management and selected employees occur and no recommendations
are made.
NON-REPRESENTATIONAL AD

Hoc

PROGRAMS

Consideration of the ad hoc nature of a given program was evidenced by the Board's decisions in both FiberMaterials0 2 and General
Foods.10 3 Each decision noted the minimal impact of such ad hoc programs on the traditional functions of a conventional labor organization
compared with the legitimate employer justification in gathering and
disseminating information.
Viewed broadly, Fiber Materials stands for the proposition that
management may legally select a cross-section of employees, on a
strictly ad hoc basis, to attend a meeting or meetings regarding matters
involving working conditions, wages or hours. Under a functional
standard, ad hoc groups which discuss and raise questions regarding
mandatory subjects of bargaining lack the minimal representational
purpose and structure required to place them within the ambit of a
statutory labor organization. Section 2(5) states that a labor organiza98. In Avildsen Tools & Mach., Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1955), a case pre-dating Cabot Carbon, the Board allowed a company to hold monthly meetings with all of its employees on company property. These meetings, labeled "Employee Assemblies," were open to any employee who
wished to attend. See Sangermen, Employee Committees: Can They Survive the Taft-Hartley Act?,
24 LAB. L.J. 684 (1973).
99. 231 N.L.R.B. at 1234.
100. This analysis is particularly applicable to smaller plants and businesses where it is not
unrealistic for an employer to utilize non-representational committees of the whole. Moreover, in
General Foods, the Board recognized the validity of an employer establishing such committees by
department. See notes 67-75 supra and accompanying text.
101. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
102. 228 N.L.R.B. 933 (1977).
103. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
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tion can be "any organization of any kind or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan.'1 While the Board or courts have
long held that a labor organization need not have the characteristics of
a formal organization, 0 5 they did not find that the type of ad hoc
groups evident in Fiber Materials had even the most minimal elements
of a representative organization.
In Fiber Materials, the three-member Board panel affirmed the
trial examiner's conclusion that the "informal discussion groups" created by the employer, because of their lack of any reasonable semblance of organizational structure, did not constitute a section 2(5)
06
This factor also was mentioned in GeneralFoods
labor organization. i
Corp. concerning the ad hoc committees therein. 01 7 Other factors affecting the functions of a given ad hoc group, however, also must be
balanced carefully.
Once ad hoc committees attain a regularity in meetings and membership, they may acquire the representational characteristics of a labor
organization required by section 2(5). 108 Moreover, as the scope of
subject matter discussed increases or the discussion turns to recommendations, the role and purpose of the ad hoc meetings moves closer to
that traditionally enjoyed by statutory labor organizations. 0 9 Minimal
requirements of organizational form and representational character
should, however, justify the exclusion of purely ad hoc meetings from
labor organization status under section 2(5).
Appraisal
The cases and principles discussed above should not be viewed as
definitive, well-established Board doctrine. They represent but four
limitations to a general blanket approach to section 2(5) taken by the
104. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See text accompanying note 17 supra for the
entire text of section 2(5).
105. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); Pacemaker Corp. v.
NLRB, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958); American Mfg. Co., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 248 (1972). Elements
disregarded by the Board and courts include a lack of any formal structure, by-laws, constitution,
officers or dues.
106. 228 N.L.R.B. at 933.
107. 231 N.L.R.B. at 1232.
108. Such regularity in meetings and membership raises troublesome questions with respect to
their continued ad hoc status. In essence, inherent within any scheme of regular ad hoc meetings
is a potential representational function which moves closer to the type of traditional activities
undertaken by statutory labor organizations. See Ampex Corp., 168 N.L.R.B. 742, enforced, 442
F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
109. For example, where an employer discusses and takes recommendations from representative employees on potential wage increases, the impact of such meetings on general employee
working conditions could trigger section 2(5).
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Board and the courts since the decision in Cabot Carbon.' 0 Still, the
potential significance of these cases must not be underestimated since
they may represent a substantial effort by the Board to narrow the
scope of statutory labor organizations.
Of all the factors developed herein, the delegation of managerial
authority allowed in Spark's Nugget, Mercy-Memorial and General
Foods provides the most viable positive shift in Board policy. The reliance upon the principal function of the committees evident in those
cases demonstrates a more flexible and realistic understanding of section 2(5). Delegations of managerial authority also appear to provide
the greatest benefits to management in its efforts to increase productivity and to employees who struggle with alienation in the workplace."'
The utilization of a functional standard in analyzing the parame2
ters of section 2(5) necessitates examining each program in totality." 1
Factors analyzed individually herein must, therefore, be viewed together in determining a given program's primary function. Invariably,
some form of balancing occurs in any decision. Application of a functional standard does, however, provide a workable method for analyzing the parameters of a statutory labor organization. It also supplies a
viable approach to the creation of innovative models of non-adversarial employee-employer relations in the non-union shop. While the
analysis here suggested may not be the only way to appraise these
cases, the functional approach advanced is a sensible way to define
responsibly and effectively the nature of a labor organization under
section 2(5). Through the application of this approach, more active
employee participation in the operation of non-union facilities may be
promoted outside the constraints of section 8(a)(2).
While it might be argued that the preceding analysis creates an
incentive for potential employer abuse of employee rights under the
guise of a program which does not constitute a statutory labor organization, such a view ignores the independent constraints of section
8(a)(1)."1 3 The purpose of section 8(a)(1) is to guarantee employees the
110. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
11l. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
112. The functional approach to section 2(5) labor organizations is defined at text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
113. Section 8(a)(1) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer:
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 7 rights are defined as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
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right to free choice with respect to whether to engage in concerted activity under the Act. Any program which impairs the exercise of such
rights violates section 8(a)(1)
even though no statutory labor organiza4
tion may be involved." 1
Generally, one might suppose that the operational provision of a
statute is likely to afford more flexibility in its application than an associated definition. This may not be the case, however, with respect to
section 8(a)(2) when viewed in light of its language and purpose. The
following brief analysis of section 8(a)(2) will explore the various efforts at adding flexibility to its application and their realistic utilization
in the creation of effective non-adversarial employee participation
structures in non-union facilities.
SECTION

8(A)(2):

CONSTRUCTING A MORE FLEXIBLE STANDARD FOR

EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE AND DOMINATION

Section 8(a)(2) was incorporated into the original provisions of the
5
Wagner Act in 1935 and has remained intact since its enactment.'
This operational section of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer
to interfere with, dominate or support any labor organization. The major purpose of section 8(a)(2) was to assure that every labor organization remained completely free and independent from any employer
influence or control." 6 Moreover, financial support of any labor organization by an employer was specifically deemed unlawful." 17 this
purpose was originally based on notions of employee ignorance of the
collective bargaining process and employee susceptibility to employer
control.

'18

The Board has long taken the view that almost any form of employer support of a labor organization constitutes a violation of section
8(a)(2), even when the impact on union operation and representation
might be viewed as minimal.' '9 In reality, this approach has created a
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976 & Supp. 1II 1979).
114. See, e.g., Missouri Heel Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 481 (1974); Illinois Marble Co., 167 N.L.R.B.
1012 (1967).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970). See text accompanying note 18 supra for the text of section
8(a)(2).
116. See C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, LABOR LAW, 419-20 (1968); S. REP. No. 573, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1935). See also New Standards, supra note 3, at 514.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-11 (1935).
118. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 819.
119. See, e.g., Gould Pumps, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 820, 824 (1977) (provided secretarial assist-
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per se rule against any employer assistance to a labor organization. 12
A line of circuit court of appeals decisions has, however, departed
from the Board'sper se approach to section 8(a)(2) and has allowed a
certain degree of employer "cooperation" with employee labor organizations.' 2' Where there is no evidence of unlawful motive in the organization's formation or operation, and where employee free choice has
not been disturbed, these "cooperation" cases allow some employer
support or assistance under section 8(a)(2). 122 This innovative, twopronged standard is not, however, without problems. Initially, it is not
at all clear whether employer motivation should be a legitimate concern under section 8(a)(2). Moreover, even assuming a role for motivation under that section, working with it is complicated by the difficulty
in discerning motive and in defining what actually constitutes bad motive.' 23 Finally, the second prong of the standard relating to employee
free choice is limited by traditional interpretations of section 8(a)(2)'s
prohibition against employer domination of, or interference with, any
24
labor organization regardless of employee free choice.1

ance); M-W Educ. Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 495, 497 (1976) (employer merely implanted ideas);
Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1170 (1955) (use of mimeograph machine); Standard Transformer Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 669, 671 (1951) (supplied refreshments and a place for meetings). A
complete list of the various factors that the Board will find indicative of illegal domination, interference or support is found in New Standards,supra note 3, at 512.
120. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 814-18; New Standards,supra note 3, at 511.
121. NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (Ist Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles v.
NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); Coppus Eng'r Corp. v.
NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir.
1955). But see NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442
F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
122. The underlying concepts of the "cooperation" approach are discussed in Jackson, supra
note 8, at 826-33.
123. Id. at 832.
124. NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251 (1939). In
Newport News, the employer had established, prior to passage of the Act, a plan known as "Representation Employees" to allow employees a voice concerning working conditions and a conduit
for presenting grievances. Subsequent to the Act's passage, the plan was amended to bring it
within the spirit and the letter of the Act. The significant changes included the elimination of
compensation to employee representatives and removal of management's representatives from the
plan. Nonetheless, the revised plan was objectionable to the Board for two reasons: any action
agreed to by the committee was contingent upon agreement by the company, and the effectiveness
of amendments to the committee's articles was dependent upon the company's failure to express
its dissatisfaction with the amendment within 15 days. The Board found that the revised plan
violated section 8(a)(2) despite findings that labor disputes repeatedly were settled under the plan,
and that a majority of the employees, by secret ballot, had indicated their desire that the plan
continue in its revised form. Furthermore, the employer had agreed to delete the objectionable
elements of the revised plan. Id. at 248. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's order, stating
that where an organization existed for ten years and functioned under the joint control of management and employees, the plan must be totally disestablished in order to counteract years of practice and restore freedom of action to the employees. Id. at 250. See also NLRB v. Grand
Foundries, 362 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1966) (Section 8(a)(2) was violated when employees requested
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The Ninth Circuit's decision in Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB,' 25
can be described as the most significant departure from traditional section 8(a)(2) analysis in recent years. In Hertzka, the employer, shortly
after the union had lost its representative status in a decertification
election, solicited suggestions on how to accomplish meaningful management-employee dialogue. An employee proposed a system involving five committees comprised of management personnel and
employees, with management being given voting power on some committees. 126 The Ninth Circuit reversed the Board's finding of an unfair
labor practice and held that section 8(a)(2) does not outlaw employer
cooperation which serves to facilitate employee free choice. 12 7 The
court perceived that the committee structure was created primarily by
employees and operated without undue employer influence. 128 Accepting this perception, Hertzka is not a radical departure from the
section 8(a)(2) goal of maintaining free and independent labor organizations.
It has been suggested that the Ninth Circuit's view of section
8(a)(2) in Hertzka may move closer conceptually to the more flexible
impact-justification approach utilized in section 8(a)(1) cases. 29 Under
this approach, employee free choice becomes the central focus of section 8(a)(2). 130 Several commentators have gone so far as to interpret
the section 8(a)(1) prohibition against interference with employee free
choice as a blanket restriction on any of the practices particularized in
section 8(a)(2).13 1 Under this view, sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) are read
synonymously. Traditional interpretations of section 8(a)(2), however,
stress that section's additional paternalistic purpose of assuring that
establishment of a committee, even though the court found the committee served a laudatory and
useful function.).
125. 503 F.2d at 625. See Jackson supra note 8, at 829-32.
126. Each committee had a particular zone of competence. The five committees were: (i)
Professional Stature Within the Firm; (2) Remuneration for Professional Service; (3) Minimum
Standards; (4) Efficiency; and (5) Physical Environment. 503 F.2d at 626 n.2.
127. Id. at 625.
128. The committees in Hertzka were each composed of five employee representatives and
one management representative. The primary purpose of the management representative was to
help reduce the long and tedious process of negotiation. Id. at 626, 629.
129. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 829-31.
130. The language of Hertzka to some extent supports such a view: "The sum of this is that a
§ 8(a)(2) finding must rest on a showing that the employee's free choice, either in type of organization or in the assertion of demands, is stifled by the degree of employer involvement at issue." 503
F.2d at 630. Still, the court also emphasized the complete independence of the labor organizations
at Hertzka and Knowles from any employer support or influence. Id. at 631.
131. New Standards,supra note 3, at 510 n.3; Oberer, The Scienter Factorin Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Labor Act.- Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491, 493
(1967).
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every labor organization remains completely free from any employer
32
influence or control.
Nonetheless, these "cooperation" cases reveal a growing concern
by various courts of the shortcomings of traditional approaches to employer-employee interaction in non-union facilities. The significance of
the various circuit court approaches is, however, limited by the fact that
many employee programs in non-union shops are created, structured
and funded by employers acting on their own initiative. 33 The presence of such significant employer participation may transcend the
bounds of even the most liberal approach to section 8(a)(2). Still, these
cases evidence growing judicial recognition of the need for more expanded lawful non-adversarial interaction under section 8(a)(2).
CONCLUSION

The Board's paternalistic view of the purpose and language of section 8(a)(2) inhibits attempts to build flexibility into the treatment of
employee participation structures and non-union facilities. Especially
where significant employer participation is involved, the approach to
section 2(5) suggested here provides an important additional vehicle for
the creation of expanded employee participation programs. By recognizing that certain employee activities or functions-such as participating in the management of the workplace-are different from those
traditionally associated with labor organization activities, recent interpretations of section 2(5) permit the creation of employee programs
that would otherwise be proscribed under the Board's strict view of
section 8(a)(2). Thus, the courts'- liberal approach to section 8(a)(2)
questions, when combined with the Board's recent view of section 2(5),
may provide the necessary flexibility for meaningful, non-adversarial
interaction in the non-union shop.

132. See text accompanying note 11I supra.
133. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.

